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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the alignment behaviors of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan during and after the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the effects of ethnic 
identities on these alignments. The literature on alliances is generally covered by realist 
scholars, but these scholars do not concentrate on domestic politics and fail to include the 
ethnic composition of states. However, conflicting parties in ethnic conflicts perceive 
each other through an ethnic identity lens, and differences between identities cause 
people to mobilize. Therefore, ethnic composition can affect the alignment preferences of 
states. Today, Armenia has developed better relations with Iran and Russia; on the other 
hand, Azerbaijan sides with Turkey and the United States. This thesis investigates how 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Ethnic problems have been an important driving factor of international relations 
especially since the last decades of the twentieth century. The end of the Cold War and 
the collapse of the Soviet Union strongly affected the emergence of these conflicts. The 
new successor states of the Soviet Union and of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia faced many problems concerning borders and minorities. One example of 
these problems is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the South Caucasus, which is the 
consequence of unresolved tension between Armenians and Azeris during Soviet rule. 
Disputes about Nagorno-Karabakh started before the collapse of the Soviet Union, and 
the problem is not resolved yet. For many decades now, both Azerbaijan and Armenia 
have made different claims about the legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh, but neither of 
them controlled the region for long periods.  
In February 1988, Armenian leaders in the Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast voted to 
request a transfer from Azerbaijan to the Armenian SSR. But Azerbaijan did not approve 
this request.1 Following these events, the conflict erupted between Nagorno-Karabakh 
Armenians and Azeris. Armenia actively supported the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians.  
Clashes continued until a ceasefire was concluded in May 1994. The remnants of this 
conflict were terrible: “About 30,000 people lost their lives during the conflict and more 
than one million were driven out of their homes.”2 Twenty percent of Azerbaijan’s 
territory (Nagorno-Karabakh included) was left under Armenian control.3  
The South Caucasus region is increasing in importance because of its geostrategic 
position. Gradually increasing energy demands require new and secure oil reserves for 
the world market. Although the Middle East holds most of the world’s oil reserves, the 
unstable politics of Middle Eastern states create concern about the future of oil policies. 
                                                 
1“Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace,” International Crisis Group, Europe Report 167, (11 October 
2005):4  http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3740  (accessed May 15, 2007). 
2 BBC News, July 7, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3052410.stm  (accessed May 16, 2007). 
3Sedat Laciner, “The Mistakes of Armenia and the Success of Azerbaijan”The Journal of Turkish 
Weekly, July 09, 2007 http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=46656 (accessed July 15, 2007). 
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In addition, Russian hegemony over the oil supply is a cause for concern among the 
European leaders since this hegemony can be used as leverage in conflicts between 
Western countries and Russia. Diversification of oil resources has become a vital interest 
for the main oil-consuming states, and the Caspian region, with its close proximity to 
European states, offers a great opportunity. For that reason, “The Caspian Sea region has 
become a central focal point for untapped oil and natural gas resources from the southern 
portion of the former Soviet Union.”4 The South Caucasus stands as a bridge for the 
transfer of oil and gas from Caspian and Asian resources. 
But the main problem about the transfer of oil through the South Caucasus is 
instability such as 
… regional conflicts and separatist movements, often against a 
background of religious strife, difficult process of democratization in weak 
states; flourishing activities of mafia networks and trafficking of various 
types directed by criminal organizations; the infiltration of networks 
linked to the international terrorism: security of oil and gas pipelines; 
ecological risks and massive economic underdevelopment…5 
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is at the heart of the instability in the South 
Caucasus and threatens the future of pipeline projects. Because of this unresolved 
conflict, longer pipeline routes are sometimes preferred in order to increase the security 
of transfer. The pipeline projects have created competition among the major powers for 
influence over the region and pipeline projects. Every new project is countered by an 
alternative project by another group. Each side is trying to keep the others out of this 
market by determining pipeline routes. Unless the Nagorno-Karabakh problem is 
resolved, there will be no overall stability in the region. 
                                                 
4Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Caspian Sea, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/Background.html (accessed February 4, 2007). 
5“The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU,” Institute for Security Studies European Union Paris, 




Each major power has great interest in the region. Turkey wants to be a part of the 
pipeline projects and any conflict in the region threatens Turkey’s interests. Besides, this 
conflict will determine Turkey’s relations with other Turk states in Asia. By not 
intervening in Karabakh, Turkey risks alienating the other new Turk states, and could 
lose its position of leadership among them. On the other hand, Iran is concerned with 
Azerbaijan because of its own Azeri population. Besides, increasing Turkish influence in 
the region and Asia can improve Turkey’s role in the Muslim world, and a Western-
looking Turkey might be a more desirable example than that of Iran.  Iran’s struggle for 
leadership in the Islamic world might deteriorate in the face of a powerful Turkish image.  
 
Figure 1.   Map of Nagorno-Karabakh and Neighbor Countries6 
Russia lost most of its influence in Ukraine and Georgia after pro-Western 
administrations took power in these countries. Therefore, Russia does not want to lose 
Armenia in the South Caucasus. Besides, Russia has fears about increasing Turkish 
                                                 
6Map of  Nagorno-Karabakh http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1222.cfm  
(accessed August 28, 2007). 
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influence in Asia. An Armenian “barrier” would prevent the direct connection between 
Turkey and other Turk Republics. Russian and Iranian influence in the region can have 
negative effects on American interests. For that reason, Azeri oil reserves and Armenia’s 
close relation with Iran and Russia will determine American policy.  
In short, energy resources, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and unresolved 
problems made the region a prime competition arena for the major powers. Both 
Azerbaijan and Armenia launched a struggle to find external patrons that would deter 
their opponent and provide support in negotiations. The major powers wanted to have an 
influence over this important region. Thus, this conflict resulted in alignment patterns 
which the realist literature cannot explain without including ethnic politics at the 
domestic level. 
 
Figure 2.   Map of Ethno-Linguistic Distribution in the Southern Caucasus, 20047 
                                                 
7Map of Ethno-Linguistic Distribution in the Southern Caucasus, 2004, 
http://www.envsec.org/southcauc/maps/ethnic.jpg  (accessed August 28, 2007). 
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The majority of the Azerbaijan’s population is Muslim. Azerbaijan’s official 
language is Azerbaijani, which, like Turkish, is included in the Altaic family of 
languages. Azerbaijan has significant energy resources,8 which Armenia lacks. 
Armenians are Christians and speak Armenian.9 Although Azerbaijan’s population is 
Muslim, Iran prefers to maintain relation with Armenia. There is a strong Armenian 
diaspora in the United States, but relations between Armenia and the United States are 
not as warm as one might expect.  
It is clear that two factors are important in this conflict; the ethnic identity of the 
parties involved and competition for power. Therefore, this thesis will examine how the 
alignments were formed during and after the Nagorno-Karabakh war. For each 
alignment, the question of whether balancing or ethnic identity played a more significant 
role in creating that alignment will be assessed by referring to the literature on alliance 
and ethnicity. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Alliances are examined in detail by realist scholars, but they usually exclude 
intra-state politics. However, the main issue in ethnic conflicts is the internal dynamics of 
conflicting parties. When an ethnic tension arises, groups emphasize the boundaries of 
their ethnic identity. They try to maintain the group’s identity within these boundaries. 
Small differences between people become very important and boundaries between 
different groups become very tight. If a group considers its identity threatened by another 
group, members of the threatened group will mobilize. Emotions drive the masses and 
irrational behaviors become normal in the mobilized group. Leaders in that group have to 
consider the fears of the group and act according to the group’s feelings. At the state 
level, leaders in the administration have to follow the group’s desires. For that reason, 
ethnic politics can affect the alignment policies of a state. Formation of an ethnic identity 
                                                 
8Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/aj.html (accessed August 23, 2007). 
9Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/am.html (accessed August 23, 2007). 
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is analyzed in the literature about ethnicity. These scholars examine how identities are 
formed and how people mobilize to maintain their identity. On the other hand, literature 
about ethnic identity usually does not cover alliance behaviors. But ethnic conflict can 
shape alliance formation, and ethnic features might affect each side’s alignment policy. 
Thus, this thesis will evaluate the role of domestic politics and ethnicity on alignment 
policies. 
Another problem with realist thought is the sequencing of alliances. Realists do 
not evaluate other states’ alliance behaviors; however, the decision to choose an ally 
might depend on other states’ behaviors. Although sequencing of alignments is not 
considered in realist writings, it can be derived from the academic literature on path 
dependence, which asserts that “the past influences the future.”10 This term implies that 
an unforeseen event in history can change the flow of other events. In other words, a 
specific event can determine how other events will occur. This view can be applied to 
alliance policies as well. This thesis will examine how other states’ behaviors affected 
alignment policies in Nagorno-Karabakh. 
C LITERATURE REVIEW 
An analysis of alignment behavior in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has to merge 
three main areas of research: alliances in International Relations, ethnicity, and the 
conflict itself. Literature on Nagorno-Karabakh or International Relations generally fails 
to include one or two of these aspects, such as alignment theories or the role of ethnicity. 
While many theories are applied to regional conflicts to test their validity, Nagorno-
Karabakh has never been examined by considering all three of these aspects together. 
Alignment can be understood by referring to literature on alliances. But ethnic identity 
and its formation should be included in order to analyze how ethnicity shapes the  
 
 
                                                 
10James Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” Theory and Society 29, no. 4 (August.
2000): 507, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0304-
2421%28200008%2929%3A4%3C507%3APDIHS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z  (accessed September 6, 2007). 
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behavior of conflicting parties in ethnic disputes. Therefore, alignment behaviors in 
ethnic conflict can best be understood by including both alliance theories and ethnic 
identity formation. 
Literature about the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Nagorno-
Karabakh generally covers the chronology of conflict. Black Garden: Armenia and 
Azerbaijan through Peace and War, by Thomas de Waal,11 examines the origins of the 
conflict in chronological order from its early stages up to the date of publication, and he 
explains how the events evolved rapidly. His interviews with the people from both sides 
reveal how these events were perceived by Azerbaijanis and Armenians. The Armenia-
Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implication, by Michael P. Croissant,12 again explains 
the historical background of the conflict with a review of the region’s earlier history; he 
then discusses how the major powers view the conflict and what the interests of 
surrounding countries are. Neither source applies International Relations theories to the 
conflict. 
Scholars of International Relations have given little attention to the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. Stuart Kaufman and Svante Cornell are among the few scholars who 
have tried to analyze the causes of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict based on theory. Stuart 
Kaufman argues that ethnic prejudice resulting in a fear of extinction among both ethnic 
groups generated the conflict.13 Svante Cornell analyzes the history of the conflict and 
applies the conflict theory to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem.14 But, both explanations 
only explore the origins of this problem. They examine the role of ethnic identity but they 
do not pay attention to the alignments from an International Relations perspective.  
                                                 
11Thomas De Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War (New York: 
New York University Press, 2004). 
12Michael P. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications (Westport, Conn.: 
Praeger Publishers, 1998). 
13Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2001).  
14Svante E. Cornell, Conflict Theory and the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Guidelines for a Political 
Solution? (Stockholm: Triton, 1997), http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/cornell_pub/nkthrpub.pdf 
(accessed March 15, 2007). 
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Realist scholars who focus on alliances in International Relations generally 
examine theories at the state level of analysis. They focus on states and their relations, 
and do not investigate the intra-state structure of parties. Current literature in 
International Relations has devoted little attention to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 
most likely due to the complex structure of the region and the conflict.  
Contrary to the main balancing theories, it was ethnic politics that drove the initial 
alignment behaviors in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh. Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians are 
linked to Armenia because of their ethnic kinship. Turkey and Azerbaijan developed 
mutual relations due to “common ethnic, religious, cultural and historical roots.”15 
Abulfez Elcibey, the Azeri President during those early years, preferred to maintain close 
relations with Turkey due to ethnic ties. A close relationship with Turkey is seen to be a 
key element in improving relations between Azerbaijan and both the United States and 
European countries. On the other hand, good relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey 
shift the balance between the two major regional powers, Iran and Turkey, in Turkey’s 
favor. In addition, Elcibey’s irredentist speeches about a potential unification of the Azeri 
population in Iran with Azerbaijan16 were perceived as aggressive. Therefore, Azerbaijan 
was viewed as a threat by Iran. Iran chose to improve its relations with Armenia instead.  
From the Russian point of view, the close relations between Turkey and 
Azerbaijan change the balance of power in the South Caucasus. Therefore, Russia chose 
Armenia to counter this alignment. The United States, on the other hand, do not want 
increased Iranian and Russian influence in the region due to increasing American 
interests and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, Armenia is excluded from 
the US-supported pipeline projects. In short, the ethnic affiliations of the conflicting 
parties stimulated alignments in the early years of the conflict; then, the other external 
powers tried to balance their adversaries by choosing an ally from the region. 
                                                 
15Akif Maharramzadeh, “Armenian-Azerbaijan Relations and the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in the 
Foreign Policy of Turkey,” The Journal of Turkish Weekly (February 14, 2006), 
http://www.turkishweekly.net/comments.php?id=1936 (accessed July 25, 2007). 
16Country Studies, http://countrystudies.us/azerbaijan/36.htm (accessed August 28, 2007). 
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D. METHODOLOGY  
In this thesis, a comparative case study method will be used to determine the 
reasons for particular alignments. Both states’ alignment policies with external powers 
will be analyzed and compared. The analysis of alignment will cover a timeline from the 
beginning of the conflict until the last quarter of 2007. This thesis will start with the 
regional power alignments (Azerbaijan-Turkey and Armenia-Iran) and then look at the 
global power alignments (Armenia-Russia and Azerbaijan-America). The major alliance 
theories will be presented comparatively and then applied to the case to analyze each 
alignment behavior. 
In essence, the main explanation for the alliances is the balancing policies. Each 
country tries to increase its security in the region and to balance against its opponent. 
These balancing alignments are the dependent variable, and the independent variable is 
relative salience of ethnic politics between the states involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict and how the sequencing of those alliances shaped the balance of power 
considerations of the global powers as they chose their allies and adversaries.  
E. ORGANIZATION 
In order to analyze how alignments have been formed in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, Chapter II will explain basic theories about alliance formation. Then, the 
literature on ethnicity will be explained in order to understand how ethnic identity can 
affect states’ policies in ethnic conflicts. Chapter III will touch on the history of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region and the evolution of the conflict. Both sides have different 
claims regarding Nagorno-Karabakh. This paper will not try to judge the validity of these 
claims, but will present them to aid in understanding the background of the region. 
Chapter IV will analyze the alignment behavior in each alignment pattern. First, the 
reasons behind the alignment behavior of regional powers, Iran and Turkey, will be 
examined. The same analysis will then be done for Russia and the United States. Chapter 
IV will also examine in detail the role of ethnicity and balancing behavior. Chapter V will 
summarize the findings. 
 
 10
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II.  ALIGNMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
A. THEORY FOR ALIGNMENT 
It is necessary to make the distinction between alignment and alliance since the 
relations between allied states, Azerbaijan-Turkey-U.S. and Armenia-Iran-Russia, can be 
described as alignments. Both concepts do not have the same meaning in International 
Relations. Glenn Snyder defines alliances as “… formal associations of states for use (or 
non-use) of military force, intended for either the security or the aggrandizement of their 
members, against specific other states, whether or not these others are explicitly 
identified.”17 While alliances include some level of commitment alignments do not 
require formal obligations. Snyder defines alignment as  
… a set of mutual expectations between two or more states that they will 
have each other’s support in disputes or wars with particular other states. 
Such expectations arise chiefly from perceived common interests; they 
may be strong or weak, depending perhaps on the parties’ relative degree 
of conflict with a common adversary.18  
Since alignments depend on expectations during disputes, members are not 
required to act together all the time. This freedom gives major powers the opportunity to 
stay out of major commitments. On the other hand, polarization between two different 
parties that are aligned against each other will prevent significant gains for each side, 
which can shift the balance between the groups. Having the support of a major power will 
increase the negotiation power of a weak state. Thus, weak states will try to bandwagon 
with a strong power and strong states will want to maintain the balance without making 
major commitments. However, after violent conflicts occur, alignment behaviors of states 
may change according to their interests. Alignments may develop into alliances, 
especially if a rival alignment poses a great threat that will cause a major shift in the 
                                                 
17Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut." Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 
1 (1990): 104 http://web.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ehost/pdf?vid=2&hid=14&sid=f5b3bef0-5a13-
48b4-8306-b803685f197b%40sessionmgr7  (accessed June 07, 2007). 
18Ibid., 105. 
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balance between opposing alignments. Alternatively, an alignment can disappear if each 
side no loner perceives the other as a significant threat. In short, alignment will not bring 
major commitment but will increase the security of weak states. 
In December 1991, Armenia signed the membership accord of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, which was “an accord on military cooperation 
with Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.”19 Under the terms of 
this accord, Russia maintained military bases and equipment in Armenia, and guards 
Armenia’s border with Turkey.20 Except for these two states, there are no signed 
defensive contracts between states that are included in this thesis. Therefore, relations 
among the states mentioned above can be defined as alignments. 
Although the relations between states which are related with this conflict should 
be defined as alignment, literature about the alliances will be used in this thesis. Alliances 
are examined in detail by many political scientists because, as George Liska claims, “It is 
impossible to speak of international relations without referring to alliances.”21 The 
history of the world is full of alliances; many states have joined alliances either to 
maintain their existence or to keep their superior power. For that reason, alliances are 
important to the study of International Relations. Many scholars explore why and how 
these alliances are established, how states look for allies when they feel their security is 
in danger. While alliance formation draws much attention, the cohesion and dissolution 
of alliances have great importance in International Relations too. Internal relations among 
the members, burden sharing or free riding in alliances and many other debates determine 
the life of an alliance; but the focus in this thesis will be on alliance formation, and on 
theories that answer ‘why, how and with whom to ally’ questions. 
Julian R Friedman includes the following elements in his discussion of alliances 
between two or more nation states: 
                                                 
19http://countrystudies.us/armenia/52.htm (accessed July 20, 2007). 
20Ibid. 
21George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1962), 2. 
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a. pairing or collaboration with one another for a limited duration 
regarding a mutually perceived problem; 
b. aggregation of their capabilities for participation in international 
affairs; 
c. pursuit of national interests jointly or by parallel courses of action; 
d. probability that assistance will be rendered by members to one 
another.22  
He distinguishes between alliances and other international cooperation experiences, such 
as “integration, multi-national community building, and economic partnership”23 by the 
a. existence of an enemy or enemies, actual or anticipated; 
b. contemplation of military engagement and the risk of war; 
c. mutuality of interest in either the preservation of the status quo or 
aggrandizement in regard to territory, population, strategic resources, and 
so forth24 
George Liska stresses the importance of conflicts in alignments, claiming that 
“conflicts are primary determinants of alignments.”25 If conflicts are very intense, 
security becomes the state’s primary concern. In his argument, conflicts cause 
polarization and a weak state will try to find support from a strong state when threatened. 
In this polarization, the strong state will align itself with the weak state, taking on the 
responsibility for protecting the weak state and its resources from the adversary; the 
strong state will then be able to exploit the weak state’s resources itself. According to 
Liska’s explanation, an alliance is not probable without an adversary, because alliances 
are “against, and only derivatively for, someone or something.”26 This definition has 
been broadly debated, especially with regards to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) since the collapse of Soviet Union. NATO was established to counter the threat 
of communism and the Warsaw Pact. NATO is still a functioning organization and 
continues to expand in membership and area of responsibility in spite of the fact that the 
                                                 
22Julian R. Friedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen, Alliance in International Politics, (Allyn 
and Bacon, 1970), 5. 
23Ibid. 
24Ibid. 
25George Liska, Nations in Alliance, 12. 
26Ibid. 
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communist threat for which it was established no longer exists. Therefore, the idea that 
alliances must be “against someone or something” is debated among scholars 
Security is an important issue for states. When a state faces a threat against its 
national existence, it will try to enhance its security either by alliance formation or arms 
acquisition. Both have advantages and disadvantages when costs and benefits are 
considered. It is the state’s responsibility to decide whether it has the resources to deter 
an enemy by acquiring arms or whether it must sacrifice some of its independence in an 
alliance with another strong state.27 Arms acquisition places a heavy burden on national 
economies. Spending money on weapons instead of common wealth programs is risky 
especially for democratic states whose voters will care more about direct benefits. But 
those weapons will then be available whenever the state needs them. On the other hand, 
an alliance will increase deterrence while sharing the financial burden: but there is always 
the problem of reliability. Allied states might hesitate to help a threatened state, if doing 
so costs too much and the benefit is not worth the intervention. Therefore, states will not 
join alliances if they think that their own power is strong enough and if the cost of joining 
an alliance is greater than its advantages.28 Glenn Snyder gives two security-related 
reasons for alliance formations: 
(I) some states may not be satisfied with only moderate security, and they can 
increase it substantially by an alliance if others abstain; 
(II) some states, fearing that others will not abstain, will ally in order to avoid 
isolation or to preclude the partner from allying against them.29 
All of these explanations answer why states form alliances. There are some 
common points among these explanations. Generally, a threat is the driving force in 
                                                 
27James D. Morrow, “Arms versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security,” International 
Organization 47, no. 2 (1993): 207, 
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64c7cc9c06df%40sessionmgr9 (accessed June 16, 2007). 
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alliance formation. If a state perceives a threat and feels that its own strength is not 
sufficient to deter the threat, it may form an alliance in order to enhance its security In 
spite of the fact that joining in an alliance restricts freedom of action and brings extra 
responsibilities, it might become a necessity in the face of a threat especially for minor 
states.  
Another important issue with alliance formation is the selection of allies. How 
states choose their allies, who allies with whom and in which conditions are the main 
questions examined by many scholars. In International Relations, there are two main 
theories which try to answer these questions: Balance of Power and Balance of Threat 
1 Balance of Power 
When International Relations are considered, the most debated subject is Balance 
of Power theory. The best case to understand this theory in real life is the history of 
Europe. Whenever European state leaders such as Hitler and Napoleon tried to make their 
country the dominant power on the continent or in the world, these leaders faced a 
coalition against them. Thus, hegemonic power on the continent was always contained.30 
Therefore, many scholars have examined the European history in order to establish a 
theory to explain how states form alliances and who allies with whom. 
The initial theory comes from realist scholars, who view the state as the main 
actor in international relations (Morgenthau, 1948). Hans J Morgenthau is one of the 
leading realists in international relation theories. He discusses equilibrium and stability in 
a state-centric system. According to his argument, stability can be gained by preserving 
of all elements of the system.31 If any element of the system increases its power, it can 
gain dominance over other elements and can even destroy them. Therefore, states will not 
allow power to be concentrated in the hands of a hegemon. They will reestablish 
equilibrium by balancing against the hegemon.32 But this new state of equilibrium might 
                                                 
30Richard Little, The Balance of Power in International Relations Metaphors, Myths and Models, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007), 4. 
31Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 181.  
32Ibid. 
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be different than the previous one. States in such a competitive system have three choices 
in order to preserve and expand their relative power: “[t]hey can increase their own 
power, they can add to their own power the power of other nations, or they can withhold 
the power of other nations from the adversary.”33 While the first option requires the state 
to engage in arms acquisition, the other options imply alliance formation. 
Other scholars have viewed relations among states as a structure; their theory is 
based on the system level. Kenneth Waltz is one of the neo-realist scholars. He claims 
that the system is composed of “actions and interactions of its units”34. In this new 
theory, states are again important factors; they exist in a condition of anarchy and “are 
unitary actors who, at minimum seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for 
universal domination”35. The system in which states try to survive is a self-help system 
and each unit in this anarchic system tries to increase its own level of protection against 
the others rather than expanding its own good.36 If a state acts more effectively and 
prospers as a result, backward states will feel threatened and will seek to maintain their 
position in the system. States achieve their purpose in two ways: “internal efforts (moves 
to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever 
strategies) and external efforts (moves to strengthen and enlarge one’s own alliance or to 
weaken and shrink an opposing one)”37. Thus, the system will not allow a hegemonic 
power to change the positions of units, and secondary states will prefer to stay on the 
weaker side, since they have a more effective role there due to the need for assistance by 
other states on this side.38 
                                                 
33Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 191. 






Whether the theory is based on units in the system or the system itself, the 
Balance of Power theory predicts that balance is always established in states’ relations 
with each other,  
Because units in anarchic systems have an interest in maximizing their 
long-term odds on survival (security), they will check dangerous 
concentrations of power (hegemony), by building up their own capabilities 
(internal balancing), aggregating their capabilities with those of other units 
in alliances (external balancing), and/or adopting the successful power-
generating practices of the prospective hegemon (emulation).39 
2. Balance of Threat 
Stephen Walt brings a new approach to alliance behavior when he examines the 
question of how states choose their allies.  He finds a deficiency in the Balance of Power 
theory. According to Walt, distribution of capabilities is not the only factor that leaders 
take into account when making their decision to create an alliance.40 Despite the fact that 
power is the major factor in balancing alliances, “states will ally with or against the most 
threatening power.”41 Threat perception was the reason why an alliance formed against 
expansionist Germany, although the power of the anti-German alliance was already 
superior to Germany’s. In Stephen Walt’s theory, alliances are formed by states in order 
to protect them in times of anarchy. Their existence is the result of threat perception.42 
Thus, alliance is “a response to threat.”43 Threat perception and alliance formation 
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against a threat are determined by four elements; “aggregate power; proximity; offensive 
capability; and offensive intentions.”44 All these factors will determine whether a state 
allies against a threat or with the source of the threat. 
a. Aggregate Power 
A state that is concentrating more power might be perceived as a threat by 
others. This power includes “population, industrial and military capability, technological 
prowess, etc.”45 A superior country with these elements can project a threatening image 
since leaders have more incentive to use them against weaker states. The British foreign 
policy toward Europe before the twentieth century and American policy during World 
War I to side with the weaker side in order to prevent the emergence of a hegemonic 
power in the European continent were driven by this notion.46 
b. Proximate Power 
Closer powers pose a greater threat for states, and proximity to the source 
of threat shapes alliance decisions. When a weak state is situated very close to a great 
power, assistance from allies might arrive very late or be denied by the threat of the great 
power. Therefore, the weak state that is very close to the perceived threat might choose to 
ally with the source of threat rather than allying against it.47 
c. Offensive Power 
States with larger offensive power will cause concern in other states. Any 
state that perceives another’s offensive capability as a threat to its own survival will form  
 
 
                                                 





an alliance either against or with the threat. Again, if alliance alternatives are not capable 
of deterring the threat’s offensive capability, weak states might side with the offensive 
power.48 
d. Offensive Intentions 
States projecting an aggressive image can be perceived as a threat and 
cause an alliance although they might not have extreme power. Although Iran does not 
have the power to attack American soil, Iran’s intention to become a nuclear power is 
perceived as a threat by the United States. The degree of aggressive intention shapes the 
alliance policy and more aggressive intentions will cause balancing.49 
All these theories try to explain alliances from different perspectives. 
Every new theory tries to fill deficiencies in previous theories. But none of the mentioned 
theories tries to explore the effects of domestic politics and ethnicity in alliances before 
or after ethnic conflicts. These conflicts are very common in the world since 82 percent 
of the independent states have a multiethnic population.50 What differentiates an ethnic 
conflict from an ordinary conflict is the identification of conflicting parties. According to 
Stuart J. Kaufman, a conflict can be defined as ethnic “if the contending actors or parties 
identify themselves or one another using ethnic criteria.”51 Ethnic identity plays a 
significant role in each side’s behavior. Ethnic elements cause public mobilization in 
ethnic disputes. Therefore, ethnic conflicts and alliance behaviors of parties can be 
understood by exploring the relevant domestic structures. Literature on ethnicity and 
ethnic identity formation can provide insight into what causes people to mobilize against 
another group and how they try to find an ally. 
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B. ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND ALIGNMENT BEHAVIOR 
1. Ethnic Identity 
Literature dealing with ethnic identity and ethnic conflict offers definitions of 
ethnicity and ethnic identity. Bruce Gilley defines ethnicity as “a person’s identity which 
is drawn from one or more ‘markers’ like race, religion, shared history, region, social 
symbols or language. It is distinct from that part of a person’s identity that comes from, 
say, personal moral doctrine, economic status, civic affiliations or personal history.”52 In 
Milton J. Esman’s definition, ethnic identity “refers to a community that claims common 
origin, often including common descent or fictive kinship; that possesses distinctive and 
valued cultural markers in the form of customs, dress, and especially language; and that 
traces a common history and expects to share a common destiny.” 53 Adrian Hasting 
brings a different approach to the definition of ethnic identity: 
the common culture whereby a group of people share the basics of life–
their cloth and clothes; the style of houses; the way they relate to domestic 
animals and to agricultural land; the essential work which shapes the 
functioning of a society and how roles are divided between men and 
women; the way hunting is organized; how murder and robbery are 
handled; the way defense is organized against threatening intruders; the 
way property and authority are handed on; the rituals of birth, marriage 
and death; the customs of courtship; the proverbs, songs, lullabies; shared 
history and myth; and the beliefs in what follows death and in God, gods 
or other spirits”54 
All these definitions include common features such as language, religion, 
tradition, history, etc. These common features might unite a group under an ethnic 
identity and differentiate the group from other groups. There are many different 
languages and other features among people, however, and thus the question remains as to 
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how these features create distinction between groups based on ethnicity. People with 
completely different background came together and live peacefully in the United States. 
On the other hand, the people of Yugoslavia shared many commonalities, yet a horrible 
war resulted from their religious differences. How and when these common features 
make distinctions between groups is argued by many scholars. There are three main 
schools about how ethnic identity is formed in a group: primordialism, instrumentalism, 
and constructivism. 
a. Primordialism 
Scholars who use this approach argue that the common features in a group 
are acquired at birth. Clifford Geertz argues that  
primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the ‘givens’ – or, 
more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the 
assumed givens – of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin 
connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being 
born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, 
or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices.55  
Given features define the boundaries between groups. Primordialists claim that since 
these features are given at birth, boundaries set by primordial features cannot be easily 
changed.56 
According to the primordial approach, new state formation and 
modernization cause problems among different groups because the new state is likely to 
have a multiethnic population. Therefore, unity can be achieved “not by calls to blood 
and land but by vague, intermittent, and routine allegiance to a civil state, supplemented 
to a greater or lesser extent by governmental use of police powers and ideological 
exhortation.”57 “To subordinate these specific and familiar identifications in favor of a 
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generalized commitment to an overarching and somewhat alien civil order is to risk a loss 
of definition as an autonomous person or, what is even worse, through domination by 
some other rival ethnic, racial or linguistic community…”58 For that reason, ethnic 
conflict is a “natural outlet.”59 
b. Instrumentalism 
The instrumental approach claims that having some features from birth 
does not define a group’s identity. Paul R. Brass refers to De Vos’ definition of ethnicity 
as “a sense of ethnic identity that consists of the subjective, symbolic or emblematic use 
by a group of people...of any aspect of culture, in order to differentiate themselves from 
the other groups.”60 Because individuals pursue social, economic and other benefits, the 
boundaries of groups might change, “depending upon the perceived needs and demands 
of the group.”61 Therefore, ethnic identity is perceived as an instrument by individuals. 
Instrumentalist scholars bring a different approach to the causes of ethnic 
conflict. According to instrumentalists, ethnic conflicts are the result of competing 
interests of individuals. Competition among elites has a great effect on the mobilization 
and manipulation of individuals. Elites concentrate on “differences between groups, such 
as language, physical appearance, or religion, in order to establish ethnically based 
political movements aimed at increasing the economic and political well-being of their 
group or region.”62 Brass claims that conflicts among groups are more common in 
“modernizing and postindustrial societies undergoing dramatic social change.”63  
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c. Constructivism 
Some scholars utilize constructivism to explain the formation of ethnic 
identity. While both instrumentalists and constructivist take a similar position regarding 
the role of elites, they differ in their approach to identity formation. Constructivist 
scholars claim that ethnic identities are “socially constructed.”64 M. Crawford Young 
argues that ethnic identity is not a weapon to defend existence as in primordialism or to 
gain advantages as in instrumentalism, but is rather “the product of human agency, a 
creative social act through which such commonalities as speech code, cultural practice, 
ecological adaptation, and political organization become woven into a consciousness of 
shared identity.”65 Boundaries and the content of an ethnic identity are defined by the 
group.66 These boundaries can change through group interactions. 
 According to constructivist thought, boundaries are imagined and 
constructed by the group, and external forces affect the identity construction. Even 
though there might not be different identities in a group, small differences can be 
exploited to create a distinction. Fearon and Laitin use Croats and Serbs as an example. 
In the 1800s, both groups were considered South Slavs, but boundaries within this group 
were created over time.67 Elites or external powers emphasize differences between 
groups and they manipulate these differences to mobilize groups. Mobilization of groups 
by external forces is more general in modernizing, post-colonial and weakening states.68  
2. Alignment Behavior in Ethnic Conflicts 
The literature about ethnic conflicts shows that power politics have some 
influence in generating conflicts, but are not sufficient to mobilize people. Mass 
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mobilization focuses on maintaining identity, and keeping the strangers out of a set of 
imagined boundaries. Elites and outside forces know the vulnerabilities of ethnic groups, 
and they manipulate these vulnerabilities. Therefore, internal politics have a great effect 
on the decisions of each party. These   politics can affect the alliance behaviors of parties 
in ethnic conflicts as well. 
Although many scholars fail to include internal politics in their discussion, David 
R Davis and Will H. Moore’s study69 focuses on whether the existence of the same ethnic 
groups in different states causes conflicts or cooperation in international relations. Their 
study analyzes scientific data sets70 to find evidence for the influence of ethnic 
composition. They discuss the behavior of an ethnic group whose members are dispersed 
in different states. In this situation, their theory is based on the following assumptions: 
IF 
• An ethnic group experiences persecution from state B, or mobilizes and 
challenges state B’s authority/sovereignty, and 
• Co-ethnics share power or are dominant in state A, and 
• State B falls within the politically relevant international environment 
(PRIE)71 (Maoz,1997) of state A 
THEN 
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• State A will take an interest in the relations between state B and the ethnic 
group, and will respond to the situation by increasing its hostility toward state 
B.72 
Davis and Moore also claim that when an ethnic minority in a state is active and 
mobilized, a conflict is expected if their ethnic brethren constitute a majority in another 
state. Davis and Moore define relations between common ethnic groups in different states 
as “transnational ethnic alliance.” Although their study focuses on ethnic groups that 
constitute a majority in state A and a minority in state B, state B may also try to find 
ethnic brethren to support it in an ethnic conflict. 
Literature about ethnic identity and balancing alliances will aid in understanding 
alignment behaviors in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Details about the conflict and the 
behavior of its leaders can make it clearer which motives were effective in determining 
alignment policies. 
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III.  THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT 
A. DIFFICULT NATURE OF THE NAGORNO-KARBAKH CONFLICT 
The history of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will be analyzed in the following 
pages, but this analysis is not intended to serve as an arbiter of which party has the right 
to govern the region. Both Armenians and Azeris emphasize the importance of Nagorno-
Karabakh for their national identity, and this claim makes the problem harder to solve. 
Monica D. Toft argues that, if a specific region has great importance and is 
“indivisible”73 for a minority group and a state, it is very unlikely that the ethnic group 
and the state will find an agreement. In other words, if an ethnic group claims sovereignty 
over a region, and a state does not permit an acceptable amount of autonomy inside its 
border, violence is very likely. Such conflicting claims of right to govern the region have 
forestalled a solution in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
Both sides have different claims about the history, and going further back in 
history makes the conflict even more complicated. Also, claiming the right to govern a 
region on a historical basis can have a detrimental effect on future conflicts. Fears that the 
losing side can claim sovereignty over a territory based on historical data may lead the 
winning side to commit crimes against humanity in an attempt to exterminate the earlier 
inhabitants. Therefore, sovereignty should be established according to international law. 
But the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, like many other ethnic conflicts, brings up two major 
problems in international law: (1) Secession and Self-Determination, and (2) Sovereignty. 
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1. Secession and Self-Determination 
Secession is a form of change in the political status of a territory, aiming at “the 
break up of a state, typically for the purpose of achieving independent statehood.”74 Self-
determination is more complicated since it does not require a new state; instead, people in 
the country decide their future and the way they will be governed. Both concepts are 
related to each other and, in some cases, secession might follow self-determination. 
These concepts are very critical subjects in International Law, and international 
organizations have not been able to find a solution for this problem. 
American leader Woodrow Wilson introduced the concept of self determination 
after World War I in order to give the right of governance to minorities in multinational 
states and empires.75 The right of self-determination is expressed in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights as follows: “All peoples have the right of self-determination. 
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.”76  
Self-determination is vital in order for minority groups to maintain their culture 
and characteristics without interruption; the concept was introduced in order to end 
colonization and to free people from repressive rule. There are many debates about the 
implementation of self-determination in resolving today’s conflicts. It is impossible to 
find a pure nation-state among today’s countries. Many states have ethnic minorities. The 
majority of multinational states is reluctant to share power with a sovereign entity inside 
their territories and thus does not want to give autonomy to their minority populations. 
Svante E. Cornell explains why central governments are reluctant to grant the right of 
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self-determination.77  According to Cornell, the first reason is that granting autonomy 
might cause the break-up of the state in the long run. Its territorial integrity might be 
endangered by the new entity. Therefore, the central government might use repressive 
measures to diminish demands for self-determination, or resort to some human-rights-
violating measures. The second reason is a fear that granting autonomy to one group will 
inspire other minorities. If a group enjoys autonomy, other ethnic groups will try to gain 
the same, and autonomy of each ethnic group within a state considerably weakens the 
central government. The third reason, according to Cornell, is the possibility of 
intervention by third party states. Many states share ethnic groups with their neighbors, 
who might instrumentalize these groups to gain territory from the adjoining state. 
James Crawford argues that unilateral secession “…based on a majority vote of 
the population of a sub-division or territory”78 is not recognized internationally except in 
colonial situation. For that reason, secession is not encouraged in International Law 
except during decolonization or in extraordinary situations, such as occur when a state 
has policies that are discriminatory or repressive to minorities, and scholars as much as 
possible recommend a solution that does not threaten the integrity of a state’s territory.  
Another argument asks whether secession can bring a solution to conflicts. 
Donald L. Horowitz claims that, because it is impossible to have a homogenous state, 
“secession is almost never an answer to such problems and that it is likely to make them 
worse.”79 It is certain that, in a seceded territory, an ethnic group can make up the 
majority but it might not form the total population. There will be some citizens from the 
previous state and there is a possibility of a conflict among ethnic groups. Therefore, 
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there is a question as to what will be the basis for giving minorities the right of secession. 
Dividing groups into small entities that are incapable of maintaining an existence in 
economic terms can create problems for regional and global security, as these entities can 
serve as havens for criminal activities. 
2. Sovereignty 
Although the increasing number of nongovernmental organizations and groups 
has reduced the role and power of the sovereign state, states are still the main actors in 
international relations. Relations between states are regulated by international law, which 
contains many provisions that protect the sovereignty of the state. Although self-
determination is recognized under international laws, territorial integrity is also a basic 
principle of the United Nations Charter. Regarding sovereignty and self-determination, 
the United Nation General Assembly has declared that 
[n]othing in the foregoing paragraphs concerning the principle of equal 
and self-determination of peoples shall be construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in 
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent 
States.80 
Every sovereign state has rights over its own territory, and Article 2 of the United 
Nations Charter forbids states from intervening in other sovereign states’ internal 
affairs.81 
B. HISTORY OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH 
1. Before the Soviet Union  
Nagorno-Karabakh is a piece of land in Transcaucasus which historically served 
as a bridge for traders, travelers, and immigrants and where great empires of history 
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engaged in battles. Rivalries between big empires had great effects on the people while 
they were ruled by these empires.82 A search for evidence from further back in history 
has created conflicting stories about who ruled the region in earlier centuries. Arguments 
about the history of the Nagorno-Karabakh region before these great powers arrived 
make the situation worse, since both sides are supported by different claims. Both 
Armenians and Azeris look back in the history to find evidences related to their 
ancestors.  
Armenian sources point to the fourth century B.C. claiming that Nagorno-
Karabakh was ruled then by the Armenian kingdom.83 Churches and monuments in 
particular are shown as proof of the Armenian presence in the region.84 Since Armenia is 
a Christian country, these claims might sound reasonable. But the counterargument of 
Azeri historians is based on Caucasian Albanians (who have no relation with present-day 
Albania in the Balkans).85 The location of ancient Albania is similar to Azerbaijan’s 
territory.86 Ancient Albanians are believed to have been Christian, who then assimilated 
and converted to Islam following the Arab invasion in the tenth century.87 According to 
Azeri claims, the western part of Albania remained Christian and the people there became 
the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh.88 Therefore, Azeris assert that the churches and 
monasteries are remnant of the ancient Albanians. 
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The history of Nagorno-Karabakh should be examined by analyzing the power 
competition in Transcaucasus. The arrival of the Seljuk Turks with great numbers 
affected the structure of the indigenous people. Turk Tribes that settled in Transcaucasus 
blended with local people. These interactions changed linguistic characteristics in the 
area and made conversion to Islam easier.89 Competition between major powers over this 
region continued. Mongols followed Seljuks. Then Ottomans came to this region in the 
thirteen century. Safavid Iran became a part of the competition in the sixteenth century. 
The Ottomans established sovereignty over Transcaucasus at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century.90 Russian armies expanding towards the Caucasus brought another 
rival to the region during the eighteenth century.91  
The need for an outlet to warm waters directed the Russian attention to the South 
Caucasus. In addition, adding this region into its territory would secure Russia’s south 
flank from any invasion. Thus, Russia started to manipulate the politics of this region.  In 
order to increase Russian influence and to guarantee local support, they persuaded the 
local elites to help them advance.92 Their advances were assisted by the Armenians. 
“Viewing imperial Russia as ‘an advanced civilization and society, a champion of the 
Christendom against Islam, and the hope for emancipation’ most Armenians welcomed 
the Russian annexation of the area between 1828 and 1878.”93 Thus, Russian imperial 
advances created early distinctions between the groups, and boundaries started to be 
shaped among the people for political purposes. When Russia arrived in the region, both 
the Ottomans and the Iranians were declining in power. Therefore, Russia did not find 
strong opposition.  
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Similarly, the administration of Nagorno-Karabakh changed between Arab, 
Mongol, Turk and Persian powers during these competitions. Cornell remarks on the 
autonomous structure during the Safavid Empire and adds that  
[this] arrangement lasted for almost four centuries, and a small number of 
influential families emerged in Karabakh, leading to conflicts of power 
among them. In the middle of the eighteenth century, the internal conflicts 
between the ruling families destroyed the local Armenian elite. This led to 
the region slipping out of Armenian control, and an Azeri ruler managed 
to impose his rule and create a semi-independent dynastic rule, the 
Khanate of Karabakh, based in Shusha. Hence the Karabakh Khanate was 
comparable to the Khanates of Baku, Kuba, Sheki, Shirvan, Derbent, 
Nakhjivan, and Yerevan. All of these Khanates were ruled by [Turk] 
Muslim families. The population components of these Khanates was 
mixed; in effect Armenians Turks, and other groups lived scattered in the 
entire area, hence with overlapping settlement patterns. It is significant 
that the Yerevan Khanate itself was an area with a notable Muslim 
majority in 1826, a situation which had been reversed already in 1832.94 
Russian influence over Transcaucasus changed the demographic structure in 
Nagorno-Karabakh as well. Especially during its confrontations with Iran and Ottomans, 
Russia tried to transfer the Armenian population from the Ottoman Empire and Iran due 
to the fact that Russia perceived the Armenians as ally. Thus, the population ratio in 
Nagorno-Karabakh increased in the Armenians’ favor. Russian favoritism towards 
Armenians led to an increase in the number of Armenians serving in administrative 
positions, but it did not cause a major problem between Azeris and Armenians until the 
end of nineteenth century. The first conflict erupted when Russia experienced the 
revolution of 1905. This problem was quelled after the revolutionary movement ended.95 
Following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, clashes again started when three states in 
South Caucasus declared independence. After the end of World War I, Britain assumed 
responsibility in this region and appointed a Muslim governor in Shusha. Thus Nagorno-
Karabakh was perceived as a part of Azerbaijan. But, this situation did not continue for 
long, and the Soviet Union consolidated its power over the South Caucasus in 1921.96  
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2. Under Soviet Rule (1921-1988) 
The status of Nagorno-Karabakh was a very difficult question for the new 
administration. The Soviet leadership discussed whether to transfer the administration of 
Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia or to keep it under Azeri rule. In 1922, a final decision 
gave the region autonomous Oblast status within the Azerbaijani SSR.97  
The Soviet Union state structure had four levels of autonomy. Union republics 
(SSR) were the highest level with parliaments and constitutions. They were legally 
allowed to secede from the Soviet Union. Autonomous Republics (ASSR) were the 
second level of administration; they had autonomy and constitutions within union 
republics. The third level, autonomous oblasts or regions, were under these 
administrations. Oblasts did not have constitutions, but they did have limited cultural and 
social autonomy. The last level was the okrugs which had lesser degrees of autonomy.98  
A federal state structure was not preferred before the Bolshevik Revolution. But 
the state territory included many nations in a large territory. Stalin had a great influence 
on the new structure allowing ethnic administrations which would unite under the 
communist regime. The new federal system was not similar to many other territorial 
federations. Every unit in the union was based on the ethnic identity of groups in a 
specific territory.  Administration levels represented “ethno-territorial units.”99 
Within these units, ethnic identity was reconstructed by the Bolshevik 
administration. Every aspect of cultural life was revised by artists, writers, architects and 
other producers to accommodate these administrative units and their people into the new 
state form. Indigenous elites were recruited by the central Soviet regime in order to 
establish the communist administration in these local units. These local elites were 
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responsible for the establishment of the socialist culture. At the same time, they would 
maintain basic national features of the groups that they represented. These elites formed 
the communist cadres that monitored and controlled all the ethnic identity formations and 
political developments.100 
These policies illuminate two aspects of ethnic literature. On the one hand, 
production of new ethnic identities increased the salience of ethnicity, which corresponds 
with constructivist theory. On the other hand, communist cadres used ethnicity as an 
instrument. They created a monopoly over the regime and controlled the allocation of the 
resources. When central power was strong, their policies were supported by Moscow.  
But when they lacked central support, they immediately exploited ethnic identity to 
maintain their power.101 
Under Soviet rule, Nagorno-Karabakh did not experience major clashes until the 
1980s. But seeds of the conflict were growing. On the Armenian side, different elements 
were emphasized in the reconstruction of Armenian identity. After the Stalin era, the 
events of 1915, when the government of the Ottoman Empire decided to relocate some of 
the Armenian population from the war zone in eastern Anatolia to areas in the south, 
became one of the main triggers of Armenian identity formation. An increasing number 
of publications focused on the eastern part of Turkey. Besides, the literature in Armenia 
started to include the Armenian population outside the Soviet Armenian republic.102 The 
ethnic literature included the Karabakh Armenians as well. A similar reconstruction was 
seen in Azerbaijan. People in Azerbaijan were focusing on the Azeri population in Iran. 
Emigrant Azeri poets and writers from Iran became a driving force with their writing 
longingly of Azeri population in the south.103 Despite increasing differences between 
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ethnic identities, tensions did not escalate to violence between ethnic groups in general, 
and Armenians and Azeris in particular. An overlapping communist identity was the glue 
uniting the ethnic groups under the Soviet Union. A common Soviet identity and the 
oppressive Soviet rule did not allow tensions to rise.104 
The competition between the two superpowers during the Cold War burdened the 
Soviet Union, and its economy started to experience stagnation in 1980s. Mikhail S. 
Gorbachev aimed at a rebuilding of the Soviet state known as perestroika. In order to 
gain support from the public, he introduced glasnost, or openness, by which the 
restructuring would be discussed with the public.105 The introduction of new policies and 
the loss of support from the centre motivated local leaders to play the ethnic card.106 
These policies resulted in an unexpected collapse of the communist rule and the rise of 
local nationalities and identities. As a result, secessionist conflicts erupted, also on the 
level of autonomous regions.       
C. EVOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT 
1. Increasing Tensions (1988-1991) 
Increasing nationalism exacerbated the relations between Armenians and Azeris 
in the last years of the 1980s. This new condition increased the hope for unification 
among Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. Every public movement was 
transformed into a political request for unification. Armenians in Chardakli, a village in 
northwest Azerbaijan, refused an Azeri director; this revealed that it was getting harder to 
live together peacefully. At the beginning of 1988, an initial flow of refugees from both 
sides started; these people tried to look for safer places away from their homes.107 
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The unification desire became a concrete request with a resolution from Nagorno-
Karabakh Autonomous Oblast on 20 February, 1988. This resolution demanded the 
transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijani SSR to Armenian SSR.108 Following 
these events, the information flow became unreliable and increased the level of 
ambiguity. On the last days of February, increasing tensions led to the first trouble in 
Sumgait, a town near Baku, where some of the refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh and 
Armenia were settled. News about two Azeri casualties in Karabakh and the expulsion of 
the Azeri population from Armenia triggered the events in Sumgait109 (see the map of 
Azerbaijan on page 38) The Armenian population in Sumgait faced attacks born out of a 
desire for revenge.110 These events could not be controlled until the first of March. There 
were many claims111 about how these events erupted, but one certain thing about the 
unrest is that Soviet forces around the region did not act to end these events.112 Soviet 
reluctance to act made the tension irreversible. Armenians in Azerbaijan and Azeris in 
Armenia felt their lives threatened by ethnic hatred.  
In March, 1988, a resolution about the transfer demand was rejected by the USSR 
Supreme Soviet, the highest decision making institution in the union, due to Article 78 of 
the Soviet constitution.113 In June, a resolution which demanded the approval of the 
resolution about Nagorno-Karabakh’s unification request was passed by the Armenian 
SSR. This resolution was rejected immediately by the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet by 
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referring to the Soviet constitution. In July, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
USSR reaffirmed the territorial integrity of Azerbaijani SSR by rejecting the Nagorno-
Karabakh Armenians’ unilateral vote for secession from Azerbaijan.114 Armenians 
became suspicious about Moscow’s stand. During the political disputes, the refugee flow 
continued with great numbers on both sides.  
 
Figure 3.   Map of Azerbaijan115 
On 7 December, Armenia experienced an earthquake, and the Soviet leadership 
saw this disaster as an opportunity to take control of events. Eleven members of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh Committee were arrested on charges of obstructing earthquake 
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relief.116 On 12 January, 1989, Moscow imposed a “special government administration”. 
Thus, Moscow would be responsible for the control of Nagorno-Karabakh, but Nagorno-
Karabakh would remain within Azerbaijan’s borders. After Moscow released members of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh Committee, the Armenian leaders developed a movement called 
the Armenian National Movement (ANM), with Levon Ter-Petrosyan as its first leader. 
Moscow’s decision to take the control of Nagorno-Karabakh was perceived as a loss of 
sovereignty by Azerbaijan. Moscow started to lose its credibility in Azerbaijan, too, and 
Azeris formed a movement, called the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF), to set goals and 
policies about the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. Abulfez Elcibey was elected chairman of 
the AFP.117 Both Ter-Petrosyan and Elcibey were anti-Communist leaders and products 
of the nationalist movements in their respective republics.118 
In July, 1989, Armenia imposed an embargo on Nakhichevan, a separated 
autonomous enclave of Azerbaijan near the border of Turkey (see the map of Azerbaijan 
on page 38). APF retaliated by starting an embargo against Armenia.119 Due to increasing 
tensions and pressure, Moscow decided to abolish its control over Nagorno-Karabakh and 
restored Azerbaijani rule on 28 November.120 Following that, the Armenian Supreme 
Soviet and the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh proclaimed a “United Armenian 
Republic” which included both Armenian SSR and Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan SSR 
denounced the declaration. Development projects concerning Nagorno-Karabakh were 
discussed in a unified Armenian budget during a joint session of the Armenian Supreme 
Soviet and Nagorno-Karabakh.121 Azerbaijani SSR perceived this discussion as 
interference in its internal affairs and condemned this act.122 
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The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union rejected the Armenian 
budgetary act with a resolution but it did not take any concrete steps. In January 1990, 
AFP formed groups to protest the inactivity of Azerbaijan’s communist government and 
Moscow. These protests turned into violence, but the Soviet military force again did not 
intervene to stop the riots. It allowed chaos to justify the Soviet takeover of Baku in the 
following days. In order to prevent the APF from coming to power, Soviet troops were 
sent into Baku to enforce martial law. This use of force and brutal suppression resulted in 
more than a hundred casualties.123 These events were declared a national mourning day 
in Azerbaijan, to be remembered as “Black January” from then on; they gave Moscow an 
extremely negative image among Azeris.124 After the military intervention, Azerbaijan’s 
communist party leadership was replaced by Moscow and Ayaz Muttalibov became the 
new party secretary. 
In February, the Baltic republics arranged a meeting to bring the leaders of the 
APF and the ANM together in Riga. Thus, two driving groups from both republics came 
together to discuss the future of Nagorno-Karabakh. But the meeting did not bring any 
solution to the disputes. While the Armenians defended self-determination, the Azeris 
emphasized the principle of territorial integrity.125 This meeting gave a clue about future 
negotiations. 
In order to prevent a similar Soviet military invasion, Armenia started to form 
militias known as the Armenian National Army (ANA) and tried to acquire arms. In 
August, 1990, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the anti-communist leader of the Armenian National 
Movement (ANM), was elected to the chairmanship of the Armenian SSR; he declared 
Armenia’s goal to become an independent republic that would include Nagorno-
Karabakh. Armenia was not the only republic requesting secession from the Soviet 
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Union.  Towards the end of 1990, a treaty that offered broader autonomy to the republics 
was disclosed. This treaty became a new Union treaty through a referendum in March, 
1991.126 
The Azerbaijani communist government, headed by Mutalibov, hoped for the 
revival of the Soviet Union with the new treaty. Meanwhile, Armenia was preparing its 
own forces and capabilities to secede from the Soviet Union. During the first months of 
the 1991, sporadic clashes occurred in northern Nagorno-Karabakh. Due to the increasing 
secession demand and the Armenian militias’ activities, Moscow began “Operation Ring” 
on 30 April 1991 along with forces of Azerbaijan to disarm the paramilitary groups in 
Armenian villages.127 The result of this operation was not as expected. It neither stopped 
the clashes nor ended the secession demand in Armenia. Furthermore, Nagorno-Karabakh 
became more estranged from Azerbaijan.128 
In August 1991, an attempted coup by the Communist Party and KGB failed to 
overthrow Mikhail Gorbachev. Following the coup attempt, the Soviet Union began the 
process of breaking apart: and two republics, Azerbaijan and Armenia, were left alone to 
solve the problem despite the presence of the Soviet military, which was in confusion 
about its role.129 In that power vacuum, Azerbaijan declared independence on 30 August 
1991 and Mutalibov was elected Azerbaijan’s president. Immediately afterwards, 
Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence by asserting a “right to secede” in Soviet 
law130 despite the fact that the Soviet constitution did not allow secession for oblasts. 
Armenia’s independence followed a September referendum, and Levon Ter-Petrosian 
was elected president. After the independence of Azerbaijan and Armenia, the nature of 
the conflict changed. In the international arena, Nagorno-Karabakh was recognized as a 
part of Azerbaijan, and Armenia’s involvement in the conflict would be considered as 
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interference with Azerbaijan’s sovereignty.131 Therefore, Armenia’s intention to unite 
with Nagorno-Karabakh was abandoned, since such a move would have caused pressure 
from international organizations. 
2. The War (1992-1994) 
Even the Union treaty could not save the Soviet Union. On December 8, 1991, 
leaders of the three Slavic republics, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, announced the demise 
of the Soviet Union and proclaimed a new "Commonwealth of Independent States” 
(CIS)132 Once again, as in the revolutions in 1905 and 1917, a major change in Moscow 
brought two nations into conflict. The main restraining actor disappeared, and remnants 
of the Soviet military were looted by both sides in preparation for a military solution. 
Armenia was better prepared for independence, while Azerbaijan’s communist 
government was dependent on Moscow. Therefore, the power vacuum became an 
opportunity for Armenia’s offensive operations. 
In the beginning of 1992, Armenia captured the villages of Malybeili, Karadagly, 
and Agdahan in Azerbaijan. Then the strategically important town Khojaly, home to the 
region’s main airport, was seized with the support of the 366th CIS (formerly Soviet) 
regiment.133 Although the massacres in Khojaly134 have not drawn much attention in 
general, the comments of Serzh Sarkisian, an Armenian military leader, indicate a 
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“deliberate act of mass killing.”135 Shocked by the massacre of civilians, Azeris 
demanded action from the administration by popular demonstrations outside the 
Azerbaijani parliament. Under popular pressure, President Mutalibov resigned and the 
Azerbaijani parliament selected Yakub Mamedov as the leader of Azerbaijan until 
elections were held.136 In the spring of 1992, Iran started a mediation effort by arranging 
meetings with representatives from Baku and Yerevan. But hostility between the two 
parties prevented any solution.137 
 
Figure 4.   The Nagorno-Karabakh Region138 
In order to create a secure corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Armenian forces focused on Shusha and Lachin (see the map of the Nagorno-Karabakh).  
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While Azerbaijan was in internal turmoil, these towns were conquered by Armenian 
forces in May.139 Thus, after the budgetary cord, a physical linkage was established 
between brethren. 
Azerbaijan’s elections were held in June, and Abulfez Elcibey, who had accused 
Iran of supporting Armenia during the conflict, was elected president. His intention was 
to create an independent state with its own army and money. Therefore, he wanted to 
keep Azerbaijan out of the CIS.140 Besides, he dreamed of creating “Greater Azerbaijan” 
by uniting “Northern” and “Southern” Azerbaijan.141 Thus, his ideas distanced 
Azerbaijan from Russia and Iran. The new administration changed the atmosphere in 
Azerbaijan. Shortly after the election, Azerbaijani forces conducted counterattacks from 
the northeast of Nagorno-Karabakh.142 Agdere/Mardakert and Shaumia were recaptured 
from the Armenians. After these initial successes, Azerbaijani forces focused on the 
Shusha and Lachin corridor which was the logistic link between Armenia and Nagorno-
Karabakh. Azeri attacks in September were countered by Armenian forces in October.143 
Thus, successful Azeri attacks in June were stopped by Armenian forces after the first 
shock. 
After the conflict intensified, Russia and the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)144 intervened to promote a dialogue between the parties 
in order to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. The Minsk Group was formed with 
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nine delegates from the CSCE members together with Azerbaijani and Armenian 
delegates. The Minsk Group was to hold a conference to provide a settlement for the 
crisis according to CSCE principles.145 Due to discord146 between the Armenian and 
Azerbaijani delegates, this conference was canceled. 
After the failure of the peace conference, Armenian forces recaptured 
Agdere/Mardakert, on the north of Karabakh, in February 1993. Then Kelbajar, on the 
northwest of Karabakh, was captured in April.147 A simultaneous offensive started in 
Fuzuli, a district capital on the southeast near Iran’s border. After events deteriorated, the 
Turkish administration announced an embargo on aid to Armenia due to increasing 
domestic pressure.  President Elcibey declared a state of emergency in Azerbaijan.148 
As the tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan increased, greater international 
attention was focused on the conflict. On April 30, 1993, the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council passed Resolution 822, which demanded “immediate cessation of all 
hostilities and hostile acts with a view to establishing a durable cease-fire, as well as 
immediate withdrawal of all occupying forces from the Kelbadjar district and other 
recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan.”149 Azerbaijan greeted the resolution favorably 
because it talked of occupation. Since the resolution did not mention it directly, Armenia 
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welcomed the resolution as well. The UN resolution urged all parties to resume the 
negotiations within the Minsk Group framework. In May, the parties agreed to a peace 
plan negotiated by Russia, the United States and Turkey.150 
This plan did not bring an end to the conflict due to internal turmoil in Azerbaijan. 
Military defeats in many parts of Azerbaijan had drained Elcibey’s credit and authority. 
Colonel Surat Husseinov from Azerbaijani army did not obey Baku’s orders demanding 
his return to the front. Instead, he marched with his forces to Baku to force Elcibey to 
step down. Azerbaijani forces did not fight against Husseinov’s men. In June 1993, 
Elcibey agreed to hand over his office to Heydar Aliyev, who served as head of the 
Azerbaijani KGB and was ruling Nakhichevan. During this chaotic period, Nagorno-
Karabakh Armenian forces captured Agdam to the east of Nagorno-Karabakh’s center, on 
June 23. They proceeded towards the south and seized Fizuli and Jebrail, near Iran’s 
border, a month after Agdam’s capture.151 Increasing concern over the Armenian 
advances brought criticism from neighboring countries, Turkey, Iran and Russia.  The 
UN Security Council adopted Resolution 853, expressing concern over the deteriorating 
relations between the two republics, calling for an immediate ceasefire, and reaffirming 
Azerbaijan’s sovereignty.152  
In October, the Armenians captured Goradiz, a town southeast of Fizuli. This 
success cut the link between Zangilan, a region in southwest Azerbaijan, and the rest of 
Azerbaijan.153 Armenian advances towards the south threatened the passage of Azeri 
refugees in the remaining part of the southwest Azerbaijan, and Iran became the only safe 
place to flee. Therefore, Iran alerted its forces to prevent the Armenian blockade in the 
south of Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey was also concerned about the great number of 
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refugees after the Armenian advances. But Russia did not want any intervention in the 
post-Soviet states. On October 14, the UN Security Council passed a similar resolution 
urging regional states not to intervene in the conflict.154 Towards the end of October, 
Zangilian was taken by Armenian forces and the Azeri population between Fuzuli and 
Zangilan was evicted. Resolution 884, which repeated the calls of previous resolutions, 
was adopted by the UN Security Council on 12 November 1993.155 
Heydar Aliyev consolidated his power by restoring order in the military and 
developing better relations with other countries. Just before the beginning of 1994, 
Azerbaijani forces started an offensive on many fronts and gained some territory around 
Fizuli, Kelbajar and Agdere/Mardakert regions. But Azeri advances stalled in February. 
After the April offensive, the Armenians regained some areas around 
Agdere/Mardakert.156 On 12 May, the warring parties attended a talk arranged by a joint 
mediation effort of Russia and the CSCE, and they signed a cease-fire agreement in 
Moscow.157 
3. Frozen Period (1994- ) 
Armenian forces won a decisive victory at the end, but the consequences were 
terrible for humanity. Approximately 300,000 Armenians and 700,000 Azeris had to 
leave their homes during the conflict.158 Seven Azeri districts around Nagorno-Karabakh 
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were taken by Armenian forces. The cease-fire agreement brought an end to the major 
conflict, but violations with casualties continued on both sides.  
 
 
Figure 5.   Azerbaijan as of 2006159 
Mediation efforts continued to seek a peace settlement. The Minsk Group, co-
chaired by France, Russia and the United States, conducted the main mediation effort in 
the OSCE. In December 1996, the Minsk group arranged a summit in Lisbon and 
recommended three principles for the peace settlement: the territorial integrity of 
Azerbaijan and Armenia, the highest degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan, and 
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guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh. Only Armenia voted against the resolution by 
claiming that the resolution predetermined the status of Nagorno-Karabakh.160 
Armenia was losing support from other countries and became isolated. 
Meanwhile, Aliyev improved Azerbaijan’s relations with major countries by negotiating 
oil resources. A new peace proposal was declared in May 1997. Azerbaijan accepted the 
proposal, and Armenia expressed “serious reservation,” but Nagorno-Karabakh 
Armenians rejected the proposal in August. The OSCE suggested a “step-by-step”161 
plan in September. Fearing isolation, Armenian President Ter-Petosyan accepted the plan 
as a basis for negotiation and mentioned the necessity of compromise.162 His 
appeasement drew serious criticism from powerful figures in the Armenian 
administration including Robert Kocaryan, who had recently been elected Armenia’s 
prime minister. Due to harsh criticism, Ter-Petrosyan resigned in February, 1998, and 
Kocaryan was elected president in March. Coming from Nagorno-Karabakh, Kocaryan is 
unlikely to favor a compromise.  
The “common state”163 plan was presented in November, 1998. Azerbaijan did 
not accept since the plan would create horizontal relations. Between 1999 and 2001, both 
presidents met in Washington, Geneva and the Sadarak district on the Armenia- 
Nakhichevan border. For both Aliyev and Kocaryan, any compromise would threaten 
their legitimacy in their republics. Therefore, these meetings did not bring any different 
solution to the conflict. The two leaders were brought together in Key West, Florida, in 
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April 2001, but this summit did not conclude any concrete solution for the problem. 
Following that, several other meetings have failed to reach an agreement about disputes, 
even after Ilham Aliyev, Heydar Aliyev’s son, became the president in Azerbaijan. 
Although the UN Security Council passed four resolutions condemning the 
occupation of Azeri territories, it did not seek compliance with the resolutions. Therefore, 
the Azeri administration has criticized the UN’s inactivity. The resolutions did not name 
Armenia directly as an occupying party, but the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe adopted a resolution in which Armenia was criticized for occupation of Azeri 
territories and for ethnic cleansing.164 However, this resolution did not require any 
sanctions. Still, after thirteen years, no solution is agreed to by both Armenians and 
Azeris.  
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IV.  ANALYSIS OF ALIGNMENTS 
Despite its small size, the South Caucasus exhibits a strong concentration of 
diverse ethnic groups with considerable ethnic intermingling. The sudden collapse of the 
Soviet Union and emerging conflicts between these ethnic groups were a surprise for the 
regional and major powers. The Soviet Union finally collapsed in 1991; however, its 
influence was effective in the region even after its collapse. Therefore, external actors 
could not establish a firm policy towards this region after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.   
Small players in ethnic conflicts tried to increase their security and major powers 
tried to secure their interest by alignment. An initial alignment was formed between 
Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and Armenia. As David R Davis and Will H. Moore 
said165, an ethnic group divided by a border strives for close relations. Especially, if the 
smaller part of the group constitutes a minority in one country and challenges the 
authority in that country, their ethnic brethren which constitute a majority in another 
country will focus their attention on the minority group. Because strong bonds of shared 
identity tie these groups, a majority group will feel obliged to support its brethren, and a 
“transnational ethnic alliance” is a natural consequence. In the case of Karabakh, 
Armenia indeed went so far as to openly support the irredentist intentions and unification 
request of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians.166 Armenia’s involvement changed the nature 
of the conflict, and an internal problem became an international conflict. External actors 
became interested in the events and defined their own positions. 
The attention of external actors to this region increased in the course of time due 
to the South Caucasus region’s significant position. The South Caucasus is very close to 
the energy resources in the Caspian Basin, and it serves as a corridor for the transfer of 
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Caspian and Asian resources to the West. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is located at 
the center of this corridor. These resources caused a competition between major powers 
and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict shaped the alignment decisions of external powers. In 
addition to energy resources, security has become a major concern after the September 11 
attacks. Ethnic conflicts that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union threaten the 
stability of the region, and frozen conflicts impede the development of democratic 
institutions. Due to the competition between external actors, these conflicts have not been 
resolved yet.  Unless these conflicts are resolved, there will be fundamental instability in 
the region; as a result, this region can be a safe haven for illegal organizations, drug and 
human trafficking, extremist movements and uncontrolled arms building.  
A. REGIONAL POWER ALIGNMENTS 
1. Azerbaijan-Turkey 
During the Cold War, Turkey was the Western ally farthest to the east. Turkey 
was physically close to the Soviet Union, thus was forced to be oriented toward the West. 
To increase security, Turkey increased its relations with the West. As a result, Turkey 
was accepted as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Thus, it 
became a member of the West’s military alliance; however, its application for full 
membership in the European Union was rejected. Therefore, the demise of the Soviet 
Union offered a great opportunity for Turkey to diversify its foreign relations with 
alternatives from the east. Turkey turned its attention towards new states which shared a 
common language, history and religious ties. 
The South Caucasus is located in the middle of Turkey’s connection with Central 
Asia. For that reason, Turkey tried to establish stable relations with Armenia and 
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Georgia.167 Without prejudgment, Turkey was the first country to recognize Armenia’s 
independence, even before the United States,168 and start normal relations. Due to 
linguistic, historic and religious ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan, close relations 
between the two was a natural consequence after Azerbaijan declared independence. 
Leaders from both sides emphasized the ethnic ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan. In an 
interview, Elcibey expressed his view about the relations between the two countries by 
saying “[o]ur people are close in language, culture and mentality. Of course, Turkey will 
enjoy pride of place in Azerbaijan's foreign policy.”169 In another interview, Elcibey 
underlined the similarities between the two countries and said “We are like Turkey. We 
are between Europe and Asia. We are striving for a secular society, but the Islamic factor 
is also present here."170 
Although Turkey’s relations with this region were originally neutral, the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict affected Turkish policy. This conflict was an internal affair of 
Azerbaijan, so Armenian involvement171 displeased Turkey, and relations started to get 
chilly with Armenia. The Khojaly massacres in particular were a turning point for 
Turkish policy. Public pressure forced the Turkish government to act on behalf of 
Azerbaijan. In May 1992, Suleyman Demirel, prime minister of Turkey at that time, 
brought the ethnicity to the front and remarked about Turkey’s support: “[t]oday the 
blood of our brothers flows in Karabakh and [Azeris] should know that Turkey stands  
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behind [Azerbaijan] and will never abandon [Azerbaijan]”172 As a response to Armenian 
involvement in advances and the Khojaly massacres, Turkey closed its border to Armenia 
in 1993 and its airspace in 1994.173 
Turkey intended to become the leader in the Turkish speaking states174 in Asia. It 
would be a bridging example with secular and democratic institutions and a Muslim 
population. However, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict became a critical test for Turkey. 
Armenian military advances disturbed Turkey. Inactivity against Armenian advances 
would damage its prestige as a leader of the Turkish speaking states. On the other hand, 
unilateral military intervention would ruin its relations with the West. Turkey’s past 
experience in Cyprus was not forgotten.175 For that reason, Turkey could not intervene, 
but joined Azerbaijan’s embargo by terminating its relations with Armenia; thus, it had 
an enormous negative effect on Armenia’s war effort. 
Armenia’s territorial rhetoric about the eastern part of Turkey also increased 
tension between Turkey and Armenia. Increasingly, literature in Armenia focuses on 
eastern Turkey and includes territorial claims. These claims are based on the Sevres 
Treaty,176 which would allow the establishment of an Armenian state in this region.177 
The new Turkish Republic did not sign this treaty, and the new Turkish territories were 
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defined in the Lausanne Treaty on July 24, 1923.178 In addition, Turkey’s eastern borders 
were defined in the 1920 Gumru and 1921 Kars treaties. 
Turkey and Armenia have not been able to solve their disputes about the events of 
1915. It would be better to bring the two sides together to discuss their arguments about 
these events. In fact, Turkey invited the Armenian side to share their archives for 
discussion.179 However, no progress between the two countries has been achieved so far. 
Instead, the large Armenian diaspora is putting pressure on Western governments to pass 
laws in conformity with Armenian claims. These efforts exacerbate relations between the 
two countries. As a result of the unresolved disputes between Turkey and Armenia, 
Armenia perceives Turkey as its main antagonist, and vice versa Turkey perceives 
Armenia as a threat, and is not willing to increase relations with it.  Turkey-Azerbaijan 
relations function as a balancing alignment against Armenia. 
From the Azerbaijani point of view, Iran and Turkey share common 
characteristics with Azerbaijan and they both would be plausible allies during the 
conflict. However, the two countries represented two different blocks of the Cold War. 
Iran was reluctant to cooperate with the West, and therefore was isolated from the 
Western alliance. Due to the West’s success at the end of the Cold War, being in the 
Western block was more attractive for Azerbaijan, which preferred a secular state rather 
than an Islamic one. Turkey would be a model for developing its institutions to make 
them compatible with Western values. Due to the large Armenian population in the 
United States and Europe, Armenia did not have any difficulty in attracting Western 
attention and conveying Armenian claims. Therefore, Azerbaijan was pretty much 
isolated at the beginning of the conflict. Turkey would be able to use its diplomatic 
relations with Western countries to counter the Armenian influence and to increase 
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Azerbaijan’s negotiation power. Iran’s chilly relations with the West would not help 
Azerbaijan’s claims. As a result of Iran’s chilly relations, mediation responsibility was 
given to the CSCE, which did not include Iran.  
Close relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey affect policies in the South 
Caucasus. Azerbaijan prefers Turkey to introduce its energy resources to the Western 
countries. Due to the need for diversification of energy supplies, Western countries had to 
cooperate with Azerbaijan and Turkey to reduce the Russian hegemony on the energy 
market. Western countries supported Baku-approved energy transfer routes. Thus, the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline projects, 
which transfer oil and gas resources from the Caspian Basin, have become a fundamental 
source of supply for European energy demands. These energy projects, together with the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway project, increased cooperation between Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Turkey, and isolated Armenia in the region. 
2. Armenia-Iran 
Iran has been one of the major actors in the politics of the South Caucasus. In 
Caucasus history, it had to compete with Turk empires, the Ottoman Empire and Russia. 
Especially after the Russian arrival, Iran, like the Ottomans, was a protector of the 
Muslim population in the region. During the Soviet era, Iran had to neglect the South 
Caucasus so as not to displease Moscow. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought a 
valuable opportunity for Iran to expand its influence not only in the South Caucasus, but 
also in Central Asia. Increasing its economic and political relations with new states in 
these regions would reduce the effects of Western isolation. Additionally, exporting 
Islam, instead of Turkey’s secularism, to these countries would help to promote Islamic 
states, which could be allies in the future. 
At the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Iran took a neutral stance 
towards Armenia and Azerbaijan. A military confrontation near Iran’s border would 
threaten its security and regional stability. Therefore, Iran tried to reduce the tension by 
bringing the two sides together to negotiate their disputes.  Iran’s mediation efforts in 
1992 were viewed as honest by both countries and a resolution was reached although it 
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was disregarded on the battlefield.180 Relations between Azerbaijan and Iran did not 
improve despite the predominantly Shi’i Muslim population in both countries.181 
Furthermore, Iranians and Azeris share many cultural similarities as a result of 
intermixed history. Therefore, a close relationship between two similar ethnic identities 
appeared natural after the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. But relations between the two 
countries deteriorated and Iran drew closer to Armenia. 
Ethnicity could have been the driving factor for relations between Iran and 
Azerbaijan, but intermixed populations had a negative effect in alignment formation. The 
border between Iran and Azerbaijan divides not only two countries but also two Azeri 
populations. At more than 20 million, the Azeri population in Iran constitutes 
approximately a third of Iran’s overall population,182 and is larger than Azerbaijan’s 
entire population. Therefore, Azerbaijan’s attention to their ethnic kinship in Iran has 
never diminished. 
The relationship between Iran and Azerbaijan was significantly affected during 
Elcibey’s presidency. As president, he was a pro-Turkish and pro-Western nationalist and 
did not accept the Islamic Republic as an example for the new Azerbaijan. His 
pronouncements about the unification of Azeri populations after the independence of 
Azerbaijan arose suspicions in Iran about the new republic. Heydar Aliyev, the Azeri 
president after Elcibey, did not further mobilize the Azeri population in Iran, and tried to 
improve relations with Azerbaijan’s southern neighbor. However, Aliyev did not draw 
closer to Iran during his presidency. Repression of the Azeri identity in Iran has always 
been monitored by Azeri media and protested by Azeris in Baku.183 Iran is anxious about 
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Azerbaijan’s attention to Iranian Azeris and perceives this attention as a threat to its 
territorial integrity. Therefore, Iran’s relations with Armenia have a balancing effect 
against potential Azerbaijan’s offensive intentions derived from ethnic kinship. 
Iran also fears the increasing Turkish influence in the South Caucasus and Central 
Asia. A Western ally, Turkey’s example can promote Western-oriented states with 
democratic governance. Closer relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey are one example 
of increasing Turkish influence. Besides, the U.S.-supported pipelines contribute to the 
rising importance of Turkey in the energy market. On the other hand, the United States 
does not allow Iran to export energy through Turkey. For that reason, Armenia is a 
barrier between Turkey and the post-Soviet states and a balancing ally against increasing 
Turkish influence. 
The allocation of both surface and seabed in the Caspian Basin is another subject 
disputed by Azerbaijan and Iran. Before its collapse, the Soviet Union agreed to share the 
Caspian Sea with Iran according to agreements signed in 1921 and 1940. However, the 
emergence of new republics changed the status of the sea, and it became a sea with five 
surrounding countries. Azerbaijan demanded the seabed and the surface be divided into 
five pieces determined according to the length of the each country’s shoreline. This 
demand meant a loss in Iranian revenues.184 Therefore, Iran proposed that the lake should 
be shared equally by all five states. Contradicting claims have always been made. 
Recently, the legal status of the Caspian Basin was discussed in a Tehran summit in 
October 2007; but the summit could not make any progress on the final status.185 
Therefore, this dispute is not yet resolved between Azerbaijan and Iran.  
The Caspian Basin became important for the United States, and the U.S. has 
contributed significant investments to the Baku-originated energy projects that transfer 
                                                 
184Judy Dempsey, “A Sweeping Struggle to Control Energy Riches of the Caspian,” The International 
Herald Tribune (October 18, 2007): 10. 
185“Focus - Legal - Tehran Summit Fails to Make Headway on Caspian Deal,” Petroleum Economist, 
(November 2007):32,  
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?risb=21_T2601914743&format=G
NBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T2601914748&cisb=22_T2601914747&tr
eeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=167340&docNo=1 (accessed Nov 6, 2007). 
 59
oil and gas from the Caspian Basin. The intention with these projects is to exclude Iran 
from the energy market and to reduce Russian energy control of the European Union. 
Therefore, the United States is cooperating with Azerbaijan to increase the security of the 
energy resources and the pipeline projects in the Caspian Basin.186 Iran is disturbed by 
Azeri policies and the increasing American influence. Therefore, Armenia has become 
Iran’s vital ally in the region against the relationship between the United States and 
Azerbaijan. 
The biggest concern that Iran has currently is an American operation against Iran. 
After the September 11 attacks, the United States started a pre-emptive effort to fight 
terrorism. Iran has always been on the agenda of American plans. The operation in Iraq 
brought the two foes very close, and tension has increased since the beginning of the 
operation. U.S. officials increasingly mention the evidence that links Iran with 
insurgencies in Iraq, and blame Iranian officials for supporting these attacks.187 In 
addition, Iran’s intention to become a nuclear power has exacerbated the tension between 
Iran and the United States.  If the United States decides to attack Iran, it may require 
another front in the north. Since Russia may not allow Armenia to open its territory for 
American troops, the only option for a northern front becomes Azerbaijan. In order to 
prevent a military operation from the north, Iran cooperates with Russia to use its 
influence on the post-Soviet states. Russian efforts guaranteed that the Caspian states will  
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not allow an operation from their territories.188 Thus, Iran’s concern about a northern 
front is reduced, but close relations between Azerbaijan and the United States are 
perceived as threat. 
For Armenia, Iran is a vital balancing ally in the region. Close relations between 
Azerbaijan and Turkey are considered a threat to Armenia; therefore, according to an 
Armenian minister who outlined Armenia’s national security strategy, Iranian and 
Armenian cooperation ensures a balancing alignment against Azerbaijan’s relations with 
Turkey.189 Armenia does not have energy resources and needs to import them. Although 
Armenia is very close to the energy resources, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict deprived 
Armenia of these resources due to Azerbaijan’s embargo. Armenia tried to eliminate its 
energy deficiency with Iranian resources. On this basis, Iran and Armenia worked 
together on a pipeline project to bring Iranian gas to Armenia. This pipeline is intended to 
be an alternative to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum projects, and will 
carry Iranian resources to Europe. Furthermore, electricity transmission lines and wind 
power stations sponsored by Iran serve to increase mutual relations between the two 
countries190 in the face of relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey. In short, despite the 
ethnic dissimilarities between two nations, the relationship between Armenia and Iran has 
increased to balance the Turkey-Azerbaijan alignment.  
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B. GLOBAL POWER ALIGNMENTS 
1. Armenia-Russia 
Armenia’s alignment with Russia is also interesting, due to the fact that Armenia 
was more inclined towards secession and independence than Azerbaijan before the 
demise of the Soviet Union. While Ter-Petrosyan announced Armenia’s intention to 
become an independent state, Azerbaijan worked for the Soviet Union’s revival. 
However, due to other states’ involvement in the politics of the South Caucasus, Russia’s 
approach towards this conflict changed over time, as Russia’s prime motive is to retain as 
much influence in its ‘near abroad’ as possible, which implies keeping other potential 
regional hegemons at bay. These regional powers, Turkey and Iran, had different means 
to reduce Russian influence in the South Caucasus and the post-Soviet states: on the one 
hand, Turkey - an ally of the West - had linguistic and historic ties with the new states; on 
the other hand, Iran offered the possibility of exporting Islam to the new states in Central 
Asia and the South Caucasus. An increase of either country’s involvement would threaten 
Russian interests in the region. In addition, Russia’s choice in the South Caucasus was to 
“balance” according to the conflicting parties’ relations with external actors. 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia was in confusion about its role 
in the world. Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s initial approach was to cooperate with the 
West in international affairs, and to establish democratic institutions domestically. 
Allowing secession for the republics was perceived as freeing the country from its 
incumbent imperial state structure.191 The results of the new approach were witnessed 
when Russia joined in sanctions against Iraq and Libya, and contributed to the peace 
process between the Arabs and Israelis.192 However, this rapprochement period did not 
last very long, and its pro-Western approach was replaced with a reassertion of ‘Great 
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Power’ status.193 In order to regain lost influence, Russia turned its focus to the ‘Near 
Abroad’ - the former Soviet states - to regain its power by bringing former states under 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) umbrella. President Vladimir Putin 
followed more assertive policies which were intended to regain Russia’s important role. 
The ‘Near Abroad’ was a crucial part of Putin’s agenda, although formulated already 
under Yeltsin. Russia’s natural resources were a powerful instrument to increase its 
influence in the former Soviet states. While cooperative states were rewarded by 
Moscow, states that challenged the CIS were penalized.194 
The ‘Near Abroad’ approach affected the South Caucasus and the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict as well. Russia tried to maintain its influence over the region by 
stirring ethnic disputes. Russian intervention would be a necessity once the conflicts 
started. Azerbaijan and Georgia, which wanted to end their relations with Russia, 
experienced protracted secessionist ethnic conflicts.  
In the early stages of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan had a Moscow-
dependent administration ruled by Ayaz Muttalibov. After Elcibey took power in 
Azerbaijan, his nationalist posture alienated Moscow. Elcibey’s pro-Turkish policies 
would increase Turkey’s influence in the region at the expense of Russian interests.  In 
addition, Turkey - a NATO member - was introduced by the United States as a model for 
the new states in the region. Thus, Turkey would reduce Russian influence in its sphere, 
and the United States would be involved in these regions.195 Therefore, Turkey posed a 
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more threatening image for the Russian interest than Iran, and Turkey would change the 
balance in the ‘Near Abroad’ with American support. 
Anti-Russian feelings started in Azerbaijan after the end of the communist 
administration, and overcoming these feelings was not easy with soft power. Even though 
Azerbaijan was in a delicate balance due to its minorities, its wealth of energy resources 
would bring stability to the country very soon. The only way to “convince” Azerbaijan to 
cooperate with Russia was to instrumentalize the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and 
Armenian security concerns. Therefore, Russia turned from a pro-Azerbaijan to a pro-
Armenian approach. It is interesting that the Armenian offensive to open the Lachin-
Shusha corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh came one day after Armenia 
agreed to join the CIS and signed the Treaty on Collective Security196 on May 16, 
1992.197 With this treaty, Russia would be able to station Russian soldiers outside of 
Russian borders and Armenia would secure its borders by Russian military. Heydar 
Aliyev realized that working against Russia was counterproductive, and Azerbaijan voted 
to join the CIS in September, 1993.198 This decision led to some success at a limited level 
in Azerbaijan’s December offensive. Thus, Azerbaijan did not look like a country hostile 
to Russia, but it was cautious about Moscow. 
In order to reduce Russian hegemony in the conflict, Heydar Aliyev used 
Azerbaijan’s energy resources as an instrument to draw American attention to the region. 
The United States planned to help the new states in their independence without taking 
assertive policies against Russia. In October 1992, the American congress approved an 
economic program called the FREEDOM - Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian 
Democracies and Open Markets - Support Act, which would facilitate the new 
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governments in their transitions to democracy.199 An increase in American attention 
towards the region disturbed Moscow. The victory of pro-Western leaders in Ukraine and 
Georgia in particular was a significant loss for Russian influence. President Putin 
affirmed Armenia’s importance as a reliable ally and remarked that Armenia was 
Russia’s “last and only reliable pillar in the South Caucasus.”200 In order not to lose its 
influence over the region completely to the United States, Russia gave high importance to 
the pro-Russian administration in Armenia. 
From the Armenian point of view, bandwagonning with Russia, including Russian 
military bases on its territory, was a necessity to increase its security, as it was located 
between two Turkish speaking states; its own resources would not be enough to counter 
cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan, which Armenia perceived as a threat. 
Against this perceived threat, the European Union would not provide military assistance, 
because the European states were reluctant to use force in disputes. It took a very long 
time for the European states to act after the break-up of Yugoslavia. Besides, Turkey was 
already a member of Europe’s military alliance. Therefore, Europe was not a reasonable 
ally for Armenia. The American option was also unfeasible since the United States was 
busy with the First Gulf War; furthermore, this region was still under Russian influence. 
Therefore, the United States would not be able to provide security for the proximate 
perceived threats. Russia, on the other hand, was willing to station its troops in the region 
and wanted to contain Turkish and Western influence. Thus, cooperation between 
Armenia and Russia would work for their mutual interests. 
Military cooperation between Russia and Armenia became the guarantee of 
Armenia’s security against its perceived threat. Both countries developed their mutual 
military relations within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Russia 
committed to the Joint Group of Troops, the Joint Air Defense System, joint duties and 
the deployment of its military in order to ensure that Armenia’s pro-Russian 
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governments’ needs were met. While Armenia’s neighbors, Georgia and Azerbaijan, 
accommodated their armed forces to NATO standards and planned to join NATO, 
Armenia, in order not to damage relations with Russia, intended to maintain its relations 
within the framework of the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), but did not plan 
to join NATO.201 
Although Armenia has not broken up its relation with Russia, the competition 
between Russia and the United States helps Armenia offset the effects of dual embargoes 
from its neighbors. The Armenian diaspora has always been effective in spreading 
Armenian claims and influencing American policies. From 1992 to 2005, the diaspora’s 
lobbying efforts succeeded in channeling $1,581.09 million to Armenia as American 
foreign assistance.202 To counter the United States’ influence in the region, Russia also 
puts major investments in Armenia. A large part of the Armenian energy sector is under 
Russian control. Russia is the biggest market for Armenia’s trade and has become a 
suitable place for many Armenians to find a job. More than a third of Armenia’s 
population works in Moscow.203 As long as the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute stays frozen, 
Armenia cannot end its relations with its ‘balancing ally’, Russia. 
2. Azerbaijan-the United States 
The United States’ policy towards the Soviet successor states in Central Asia and 
the South Caucasus, where the hegemony of the Soviet Union reigned for decades, had to 
include many dimensions and elements due to the fact that United States was caught 
unprepared for the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union. The main purpose of American 
policy was “securing sovereignty of the states, combating terrorism and drug trafficking, 
and promoting democracy, economic reforms, and integration into international 
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communities.”204 Its main fear, on the other hand, was the security of energy sources and 
the nuclear arsenal left behind in the successor states, because, under volatile new 
administrations, energy resources and a nuclear arsenal could have been acquired by 
terrorist organizations. However, the United States did not want to carry out assertive 
policies in what was still perceived the Russian sphere of influence in order not to 
alienate the initial pro-Western approach of the Russian administration. When Russian 
foreign policy abandoned its pro-Western approach and focused on the ‘Near Abroad’, 
rivalry between Russia and the United States emerged. 
Energy resources and their transfer from Central Asia to the West became the 
center of this rivalry. The United States tried to deny the energy hegemony of Russia and 
Iran, which improved its relations with Russia by buying Russian arms, and wanted to 
eliminate Russian and Iranian influence over these regions. American assistance 
encouraged Soviet successor states to increase cooperation with the United States. 
The September 11 attacks increased the American focus on Central Asia and the 
South Caucasus since precarious successor states were potential targets for extremist 
groups, and lack of experience in law enforcement might prevent these states from taking 
the necessary steps to keep such groups from gaining power. Central Asia might become 
a safe haven for terrorist groups. Therefore, the United State tried to establish military 
bases and close relations with the successor states in order to increase these states’ 
capabilities for dealing with terrorist groups. 
While the United States did not have an explicit policy for all the successor states, 
the South Caucasus was another puzzle that the United States did not know well. The 
United States could not assess how to react in the early phase of the conflict between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, and did not want to get involved directly in a region where 
Russia had great influence. American policy evolved over time. Due to the importance of 
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the region and the involvement of Russia and the regional powers Iran and Turkey, 
staying out of the region’s politics would threaten American vital interests. 
Especially after the September 11 attacks, the importance of this region rose. 
Increasing Iranian or Russian presence and influence in the South Caucasus would 
restrict the United States’ ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan and in Central Asia. Having a 
military presence in this region would not only reduce the cost of operations in 
Afghanistan but also deter its rivals Iran and Russia. An American presence would 
safeguard American interests and prevent Russian and Iranian hegemony over this region. 
Therefore, American policy in this region was to counter Russia and Iran. 
The early American policy was affected by ethnic politics due to the large and 
effective Armenian diaspora in the United States. Azerbaijan was perceived as an 
aggressor state in the conflict as a result of the Armenian diaspora’s lobbying efforts. 
Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act banned American foreign assistance to the 
Azerbaijani government, and was approved just after the Azeri offensive in June 1992.205  
Since Russia was in favor of the status quo and tried to keep the Near Abroad 
under control, Azerbaijan tried to develop its relationship with the United States to 
counter Russian hegemony. Azerbaijan’s energy resources, its borders with Iran and 
Russia, and its location between Asian resources and the West increased Azerbaijan’s 
strategic relevance in American foreign affairs. Knowing these facts, the Azeri President 
effectively used Azerbaijan’s natural resources to change perceptions about his country. 
On September 24, 1994, Azerbaijan signed an agreement - the ‘Contract of the Century’ - 
with thirteen oil companies from eight countries for joint development of Azeri 
reserves.206 The increased involvement of Western and American oil companies in 
Azerbaijan’s energy sector led to an increase in governmental attention to Azerbaijan. 
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This strategy proved effective in the United States. Another effective NGO in United 
States politics, “Texas Oil”, developed a strong interest in the stability of Azerbaijan and 
became the counter lobby against the Armenian diaspora.207 Due to a significant amount 
of investment by American oil companies, Azerbaijan’s security became highly 
important for the United States. Thus, American interest in this region started to warm 
up, and the image of Azerbaijan in the American government started to improve. 
The September 11 attacks were a turning point for relations between Azerbaijan 
and the United States. The American administration welcomed the unconditional 
Azerbaijani contribution. Azerbaijan opened its territory for American military flights to 
Afghanistan, gave permission for US troops to be stationed temporarily in Azerbaijan, 
supported the U.N. resolutions in favor of the United States, and cooperated with 
American institutions to monitor money trafficking to terrorist groups.208 In addition, 
Azerbaijan supported U.S. operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo by sending 
Azerbaijani soldiers. In response to Azerbaijan’s support, the American president was 
given the authority to waive Section 907 on January 10, 2002. Beginning in 2002, 
President George W. Bush waived Section 907 each year. In addition, the United States 
helped Azerbaijan to improve its border security and air defense within the Caspian 
Security Programme209 In short, cool relations between Azerbaijan and the United States 
warmed up because Azerbaijan distanced itself from Russia and Iran, and cooperated 
with the United States on energy and military issues. 
While Azerbaijan tried to improve its relations with the United States, Armenian 
relations with Washington took an opposite direction. Armenia’s threat perception from 
Azerbaijan and Turkey guided Armenian policy towards Iran. Iran was the only ally in 
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the region that could balance against Azerbaijani and Turkish cooperation. Meanwhile, 
Russia was the only country able to give the security guarantee that Armenia felt was 
necessary. Armenian dependence on Russia in energy, the military and the economy 
restricts its relations with the West and the United States. The Russian troop presence on 
Armenian territory increases Russian influence in the region and threatens the United 
States’ freedom of action. Therefore, the United States does not want to disturb Russia by 
increasing its involvement in Armenia. However, the United States cannot break all ties 
with Armenia due to the large Armenian population in the United States, and allow 
Russia to act freely in that country. Thus, the United States continues to give a significant 
amount of aid to Armenia, but supports pipeline projects that exclude Armenia because of 
Armenia’s relations with Iran and Russia. In order to secure American interests in the 
South Caucasus, the United States focuses on Azerbaijan to balance against Russia and 
Iran.  
C. SUMMARY  
This chapter analyzed the characteristics of the alignments that were formed 
during and after the Nagorno-Karabakh war. This analysis started with regional powers 
and then looked at the global powers. A “transnational ethnic alliance” already existed 
between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. Azerbaijan preferred Turkey to 
balance against Armenia, and this preference was based on ethnic ties between 
Azerbaijan and Turkey. It was also motivated by the Armenian-Turkish rupture due to the 
events of 1915. Thus, ethnicity was the driving force in the initial alignments. 
After these alignments were formed, other powers defined their policies. Iran 
improved its relations with Armenia to balance against the increasing Turkish influence 
and Azerbaijan’s offensive rhetoric. Similarly, Russia wanted to maintain its influence in 
the South Caucasus and contain Turkey’s influence in the ‘Near Abroad’. Therefore, 
Armenia was a balancing ally against the West and Turkey. Armenia’s relations with 




in the United States was very effective, American policy wanted to balance against 
Russia and Iran by allying with Azerbaijan; consequently, Armenia was excluded from 
the U.S.-supported energy projects.  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
States are the main actors in international relations and they are always in a 
struggle for survival. While some states disappeared in history, others gained power and 
survived for centuries. Even the most powerful states in a specific time could not 
maintain their superiority due to challenges from other states. Alliance formation is one 
of the means for states to survive. How states act in the international arena and how they 
form alliances have become the main subjects of political science. Political scientists try 
to explore state behavior in international relations and to establish theories about alliances 
between states. 
Realist scholars who try to explain alliance formation generally focus on power, 
which includes a state’s overall capabilities. The main theory in realist thought is balance 
of power, which contends that an accumulation of excess power of one state will cause an 
alliance to form against that state. Different explanations for the balance of power theory 
arose from an explanation of the role of states. The balance of threat theory of Stephen 
Walt, which introduced a new approach to alliance formation, asserts that threat 
perception will determine states’ behavior in international relations. Either balancing or 
bandwagoning alliances will be shaped according to the threat’s capabilities. 
This thesis investigates the role of ethnic identity which is usually disregarded in 
realist explanations. Three approaches – primordial, instrumental, and constructivist - try 
to explain how ethnic identity becomes salient. In any case, once a border is created to 
define an ethnic group, its exclusive nature will cause tension with other ethnic groups. If 
the tension becomes very high, different ethnic groups cannot live side-by-side any more. 
People start to behave contrary to rational utility maximizing rationales, and cannot 
explain why they act in a specific way. Therefore, ethnic disputes cannot be understood 
without paying attention to domestic politics. Ethnic identity becomes the driving force 
of ethnic groups, and groups with a fear of losing their ethnic identity may affect states’ 
policies.  
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The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a desperate example of ethnic conflicts. 
Borders of ethnic identities were constructed rigidly under the Soviet federal structure, 
and the Soviet Union’s demise caused a flare up of ethnic disputes in the successor states.  
Ethnic identity became an important subject for the conflicting parties. Any concessions 
to the opposite ethnic group terminated the political life of elites on both sides. Thus, 
rapprochement became very difficult for the two sides.  
There was a lack of knowledge about these issues among Western scholars since 
the region was under Soviet rule. The chaotic nature of the 1990s, which saw many 
conflicts and new international structures rising after the demise of the Soviet Union, 
caused insufficient attention to be directed toward the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and 
political science scholars did not focus enough on the new states’ behavior. Thus, this 
thesis contributes to the limited literature on this conflict by focusing on alliances. 
For centuries, the importance of the region has been so high that no external 
power wanted to be out of its politics.  Great empires of history contested for sovereignty 
over this region due to its strategic location. While it was a bridge between Asia and the 
West, its importance increased when energy resources were discovered there. Soviet 
hegemony reigned over the region for decades; its power kept the other players outside 
the region. The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the balance in Central Asia and the 
South Caucasus.  
In this new situation, regional and global powers had great interests in the post-
Soviet states but none could move easily. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in particular 
caused polarization at each level. Regional powers - Turkey and Iran - and global powers 
–the United States and Russia - aligned with one of the conflicting parties according to 
their interests and their rival’s behaviors.  
Contradicting alignments were formed between states that had great interest in the 
region. Realist scholars usually do not mention the sequencing of alliances, but conflicts 
in Nagorno-Karabakh indicated that some alignment behaviors resulted from other states’ 
behavior. An initial alignment was witnessed between Armenians in Armenia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh. Having common ties caused a “transnational ethnic alliance.” 
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Armenia’s support for the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians changed Turkey’s policy. 
Having better relations with its neighbors to the east would be more beneficial for 
Turkey, but it had to stand with Azerbaijan against the Armenians, who had poor 
relations with Turkish government. Azerbaijan’s favoritism towards Turkey and its 
preference for a Western-oriented secular state caused it to become alienated from Russia 
and Iran. Turkey’s intention to use common ties to increase its relations with former 
Soviet states would increase Turkey’s power in Asia. Therefore, Russia and Iran aligned 
with Armenia to balance against the alignment between Azerbaijan and Turkey. Russian 
plans to increase its influence on successor states required it to maintain the status quo in 
the region. In order to balance against Russia, Azerbaijan focused on the United States. 
Azerbaijan’s oil resources and willingness to cooperate with the West changed its image 
in the United States. Meanwhile, Armenia’s dependence on Russia and its close relation 
with Iran caused cooler relations between the United States and Armenia, in spite of the 
fact that the United States hosts a large number of Armenians.  
Ethnic borders between the two nations were constructed so rigidly that neither 
side thinks about the possibility of living together again. For that reason, more than a 
decade after the ceasefire, an agreement has not yet been signed. No one wants to step 
forward to yield to the opposite side. This persistence thwarts the peace negotiations. The 
peace process is stuck in issues of secession and territorial integrity. Because of their 
geostrategic location, the importance of these countries is so high that external powers do 
not resort to coercive methods to force Armenia and Azerbaijan into mutual concessions. 
This might alienate both of them and Armenia and Azerbaijan might lose interest in 
continuing a relationship with the external powers. Therefore, an agreement between the 
two sides has become a very distant possibility. However, the frozen status of the conflict 
is very risky because the two countries are in an arms race. If the military confrontation 
erupts again greater disasters for the two nations may lie ahead. 
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